Efficient unidirectional proxy re-encryption

  • Authors:
  • Sherman S. M. Chow;Jian Weng;Yanjiang Yang;Robert H. Deng

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, NY;Department of Computer Science, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China;Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore;School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore

  • Venue:
  • AFRICACRYPT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Cryptology in Africa
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into one encrypting the same plaintext for Bob. The proxy only needs a re-encryption key given by Alice, and cannot learn anything about the plaintext encrypted. This adds flexibility in various applications, such as confidential email, digital right management and distributed storage. In this paper, we study unidirectional PRE, which the re-encryption key only enables delegation in one direction but not the opposite. In PKC 2009, Shao and Cao proposed a unidirectional PRE assuming the random oracle. However, we show that it is vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). We then propose an efficient unidirectional PRE scheme (without resorting to pairings). We gain high efficiency and CCA-security using the “token-controlled encryption” technique, under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the random oracle model and a relaxed but reasonable definition.