Properties of the discrete differential with cryptographic applications

  • Authors:
  • Daniel Smith-Tone

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Mathematics, Indiana University

  • Venue:
  • PQCrypto'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Recently, the C*− signature scheme has been completely broken by Dubois et al. [1,2]. As a consequence, the security of SFLASH and other multivariate public key systems have been impaired. The attacks presented in [1,2] rely on a symmetry of the differential of the encryption mapping. In [3], Ding et al. experimentally justify the use projection as a method of avoiding the new attack, and some theoretical backing to this method is given in [4]. In this paper, we derive some properties of the discrete differential, extend the theoretical justification for the reparation in [3], and establish the exact context in which this attack is applicable.