Information Theory and Reliable Communication
Information Theory and Reliable Communication
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Quantitative Information Flow, Relations and Polymorphic Types
Journal of Logic and Computation
Assessing security threats of looping constructs
Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Measuring channel capacity to distinguish undue influence
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Quantitative Notions of Leakage for One-try Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Automatic Discovery and Quantification of Information Leaks
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A decision procedure for bit-vectors and arrays
CAV'07 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Computer aided verification
Approximation and Randomization for Quantitative Information-Flow Analysis
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Quantitative Information Flow - Verification Hardness and Possibilities
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Vulnerability Bounds and Leakage Resilience of Blinded Cryptography under Timing Attacks
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Reconciling Belief and Vulnerability in Information Flow
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Quantifying information leaks in software
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Computing the leakage of information-hiding systems
TACAS'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
Statistical measurement of information leakage
TACAS'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
Automatic quantification of cache side-channels
CAV'12 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Symbolic quantitative information flow
ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes
SAT-Based analysis and quantification of information flow in programs
QEST'13 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Quantitative Evaluation of Systems
CacheAudit: a tool for the static analysis of cache side channels
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
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Theories of quantitative information flow have seen growing interest recently, in view of the fundamental importance of controlling the leakage of confidential information, together with the pragmatic necessity of tolerating intuitively "small" leaks. Given such a theory, it is crucial to develop automated techniques for calculating the leakage in a system. In this paper, we address this question in the context of deterministic imperative programs and under the recently-proposed min-entropy measure of information leakage, which measures leakage in terms of the confidential information's vulnerability to being guessed in one try by an adversary. In this context, calculating the maximum leakage of a program reduces to counting the number of feasible outputs that it can produce. We approach this task by determining patterns among pairs of bits in the output, for instance by determining that two bits must be unequal. By counting the number of solutions to the two-bit patterns, we obtain an upper bound on the number of feasible outputs and hence on the leakage. We explore the effectiveness of our approach on a number of case studies, in terms of both efficiency and accuracy.