Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
End-to-end arguments in system design
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Communications of the ACM
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Optics and Information Theory
Digital Certificates: Applied Internet Security (with CD-ROM)
Digital Certificates: Applied Internet Security (with CD-ROM)
Information Theory and Reliable Communication
Information Theory and Reliable Communication
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
An independent audit framework for software dependent voting systems
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
Designing and implementing malicious hardware
LEET'08 Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
Hack-a-Vote: Security Issues with Electronic Voting Systems
IEEE Security and Privacy
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Multi-authority secret-ballot elections with linear work
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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We present a new, comprehensive framework to qualitatively improve election outcome trustworthiness, where voting is modeled as an information transfer process. Although voting is deterministic (all ballots are counted), information is treated stochastically using Information Theory. Error considerations, including faults, attacks, and threats by adversaries, are explicitly included. The influence of errors may be corrected to achieve an election outcome error as close to zero as desired (error-free), with a provably optimal design that is applicable to any type of voting, with or without ballots. Sixteen voting system requirements, including functional, performance, environmental and non-functional considerations, are derived and rated, meeting or exceeding current public-election requirements. The voter and the vote are unlinkable (secret ballot) although each is identifiable. The Witness-Voting System (Gerck, 2001) is extended as a conforming implementation of the provably optimal design that is error-free, transparent, simple, scalable, robust, receipt-free, universally-verifiable, 100% voter-verified, and end-to-end audited.