Incentive-Compatibility in a distributed autonomous currency system

  • Authors:
  • Kenji Saito;Eiichi Morino;Jun Murai

  • Affiliations:
  • Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University, Kanagawa, Japan;Gesell Research Society, Japan;Faculty of Environmental Information, Keio University

  • Venue:
  • AP2PC'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Peer-to-peer complementary currencies can be powerful tools for promoting exchanges and building sustainable relationships among selfish peers on the Internet. i-WAT[1] is a proposed such currency based on the WAT System, a polycentric complementary currency using WAT tickets as its media of exchange. Participants spontaneously issue and circulate the tickets as needed, whose values are backed up by chains of trust. i-WAT implements the tickets electronically by exchanging messages signed in OpenPGP. This paper claims that the design of i-WAT is incentive-compatible as to protection against moral hazards, or threats caused by selfish peers because they may take advantage of the rules; such hazards are defused in i-WAT if the participants react against misbehaviors of others by pursuing their own benefits. A reference implementation of i-WAT has been developed in the form of an XMPP instant messaging client. We have been putting the currency system into practical use since June 2004.