One-Round protocol for two-party verifier-based password-authenticated key exchange

  • Authors:
  • Jeong Ok Kwon;Kouichi Sakurai;Dong Hoon Lee

  • Affiliations:
  • Graduate School of Information Security CIST, Korea University, Seoul, Korea;Department of Computer Science and Communication Engineering, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan;Graduate School of Information Security CIST, Korea University, Seoul, Korea

  • Venue:
  • CMS'06 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP TC-6 TC-11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) for two-party allows a client and a server communicating over a public network to share a session key using a human-memorable password only. PAKE protocols can be served as basic building blocks for constructing secure, complex, and higher-level protocols which were initially built upon the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In this paper, we propose a provably-secure verifier-based PAKE protocol well suited with the TLS protocol which requires only a single round. The protocol is secure against attacks using compromised server's password file and known-key attacks, and provides forward secrecy, which is analyzed in the ideal hash model. This scheme matches the most efficient verifier-based PAKE protocol among those found in the literature. It is the first provably-secure one-round protocol for verifier-based PAKE in the two-party setting.