A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Forward-Secure Signatures with Optimal Signing and Verifying
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A "Paradoxical" Indentity-Based Signature Scheme Resulting from Zero-Knowledge
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Self-Delegation with Controlled Propagation - or - What If You Lose Your Laptop
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Key-Insulated Public Key Cryptosystems
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Strong Key-Insulated Signature Schemes
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Policy-based authentication for mobile agents
ISPEC'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information security practice and experience
Efficient certificateless proxy signature scheme with provable security
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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We improve Malkin et al's construction (Eurocrypt'04) of the proxy signature scheme in the random oracle model. Unlike Malkin et al's scheme, the proposed scheme does not assume the existence of the trusted secure device, which has a global secret key that all users' private keys can be recovered with. This makes the proposed scheme more scalable and efficient because users need not access and cooperate with the secure device to generate their public/private key pairs. We show that the proposed scheme is provably secure based on the modified strong RSA assumption that was made by the Itkis et al (CRYPTO'01).