Social software for coalition formation

Authors:
Agnieszka Rusinowska;Rudolf Berghammer;Patrik Eklund;Jan-Willem van der Rijt;Marc Roubens;Harrie de Swart
Affiliations:
Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, HK, The Netherlands;Institute of Computer Science, University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany;Department of Computing Science, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden;Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, GL, The Netherlands;Institute of Mathematics, B37, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium;Faculty of Philosophy, Tilburg University, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Venue:
TARSKI'02-05 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments - Volume 2
Year:
2006

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Abstract

This paper concerns an interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation. We apply the MacBeth software, relational algebra, the RelView tool, graph theory, bargaining theory, social choice theory, and consensus reaching to a model of coalition formation. A feasible government is a pair consisting of a coalition of parties and a policy supported by this coalition. A feasible government is stable if it is not dominated by any other feasible government. Each party evaluates each government with respect to certain criteria. MacBeth helps to quantify the importance of the criteria and the attractiveness and repulsiveness of governments to parties with respect to the given criteria. Feasibility, dominance, and stability are formulated in relation-algebraic terms. The RelView tool is used to compute the dominance relation and the set of all stable governments. In case there is no stable government, i.e., in case the dominance relation is cyclic, we apply graph-theoretical techniques for breaking the cycles. If the solution is not unique, we select the final government by applying bargaining or appropriate social choice rules. We describe how a coalition may form a government by reaching consensus about a policy.