Use of elliptic curves in cryptography
Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
TinyPK: securing sensor networks with public key technology
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Sizzle: A Standards-Based End-to-End Security Architecture for the Embedded Internet (Best Paper)
PERCOM '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Short paper: Tri-party TLS Adaptation for Trust Delegation in Home Networks
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
IPFIX for wireless sensors in home networks
WD'09 Proceedings of the 2nd IFIP conference on Wireless days
Flexible key exchange negotiation for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international workshop on Wireless network testbeds, experimental evaluation and characterization
Gathering sensor data in home networks with IPFIX
EWSN'10 Proceedings of the 7th European conference on Wireless Sensor Networks
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Adapting security protocols to wireless sensor networks architectures is a challenging research field because of their specific constraints. Actually, sensors are computationally weak devices, unable to perform heavy cryptographic operations like classical asymmetric algorithms (RSA, Diffie-Hellman). In this paper, we introduce Tiny 3-TLS, an extension and adaptation of TLS handshake sub-protocol that allows establishing secure communications between sensing nodes and remote monitoring terminals. Our protocol aims at guaranteeing the integrity and confidentiality of communications between sensors and distant terminals, after having established mutual authentication between the two parties. In order to achieve these security goals without putting too much burden on sensing devices, Tiny 3-TLS rely on an intermediate node, the sink node. Depending on the trustworthiness of this sink node and on the applications, we propose two versions of our proposition. Besides, we provide a formal validation of the protocol's security goals achievement and an evaluation of its computation and delay performances.