Second preimages for SMASH

  • Authors:
  • Mario Lamberger;Norbert Pramstaller;Christian Rechberger;Vincent Rijmen

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

This article presents a rare case of a deterministic second preimage attack on a cryptographic hash function. Using the notion of controllable output differences, we show how to construct second preimages for the SMASH hash functions. If the given preimage contains at least n+1 blocks, where n is the output length of the hash function in bits, then the attack is deterministic and requires only to solve a set of n linear equations. For shorter preimages, the attack is probabilistic.