Trusted isolation environment: an attestation architecture with usage control model

  • Authors:
  • Anbang Ruan;Qingni Shen;Liang Gu;Li Wang;Lei Shi;Yahui Yang;Zhong Chen

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing, China;School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing, China;Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies, Peking University, Beijing, China;School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing, China;Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies, Peking University, Beijing, China;School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing, China;School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing, China

  • Venue:
  • ICICS'09 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information and Communications Security
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) proposed remote attestation as a solution for establishing trust among distributed applications. However, current TCG attestation architecture requires challengers to attest to every program loaded on the target platform, which will increase the attestation overhead and bring privacy leakage and other security risks. In this paper, we define a conceptual model called the Trusted Isolation Environment (TIE) to facilitate remote attestation. We then present the implementation of TIE with our tailored Usage CONtrol model (UCONRA) and a set of system-defined policies. With its continuous and mutable feature and obligation support, we construct the TIE with flexibility. Lastly, we propose our attestation architecture with UCONRA gaining the benefits of scalable and lightweight.