Enforcing stateful authorization and information flow policies in fine

  • Authors:
  • Nikhil Swamy;Juan Chen;Ravi Chugh

  • Affiliations:
  • Microsoft Research, Redmond;Microsoft Research, Redmond;University of California, San Diego

  • Venue:
  • ESOP'10 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Proving software free of security bugs is hard. Languages that ensure that programs correctly enforce their security policies would help, but, to date, no security-typed language has the ability to verify the enforcement of the kinds of policies used in practice—dynamic, stateful policies which address a range of concerns including forms of access control and information flow tracking. This paper presents Fine, a new source-level security-typed language that, through the use of a simple module system and dependent, refinement, and affine types, checks the enforcement of dynamic security policies applied to real software. Fine is proven sound. A prototype implementation of the compiler and several example programs are available from http://research.microsoft.com/fine.