Low latency and cheat-proof event ordering for peer-to-peer games
NOSSDAV '04 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
A Secure Event Agreement (SEA) protocol for peer-to-peer games
ARES '06 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
An electronic voting protocol with deniable authentication for mobile ad hoc networks
Computer Communications
A Verifiable Electronic Voting Scheme over the Internet
ITNG '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Sixth International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations
Improving the Security of Non-PKI Methods for Public Key Distribution
ITNG '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Sixth International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations
A Secure Billing Protocol for Grid Computing
ITNG '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Sixth International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations
An efficient biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
IAS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Fifth International Conference on Information Assurance and Security - Volume 01
A new nonrepudiable threshold proxy signature scheme with valid delegation period
ICCSA'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Computational science and its applications - Volume Part III
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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In 2008, Chan et al. presented an efficient and secure event signature (EASES) protocol for peer-to-peer massively multiplayer online games (P2P MMOGs). EASES could achieve non-repudiation, event commitment, save memory, bandwidth and reduce the complexity of the computations. However, we find that Chan et al. EASES protocol suffers from the passive attack and this attack will make a malicious attacker to impersonate any player to replay the event update messages for cheating. As a result, we introduce a simple countermeasure to prevent impersonate attack while the merits of the original EASES protocol are left unchanged.