Quantitative evaluation of unlinkable ID matching schemes
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
YA-TRAP: Yet Another Trivial RFID Authentication Protocol
PERCOMW '06 Proceedings of the 4th annual IEEE international conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Defining Strong Privacy for RFID
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
When Compromised Readers Meet RFID
Information Security Applications
An efficient authentication protocol for RFID systems resistant to active attacks
EUC'07 Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Emerging direction in embedded and ubiquitous computing
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
RFID traceability: a multilayer problem
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Towards a practical solution to the RFID desynchronization problem
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
mCarve: Carving attributed dump sets
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Implementation of terminal middleware platform for mobile RFID computing
International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing
A privacy-restoring mechanism for offline RFID systems
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Hi-index | 0.00 |
This paper establishes a novel model for RFID schemes where readers are not continuously connected to the back office, but only periodically. Furthermore, adversaries are not only capable of compromising tags, but also of compromising readers. This more properly models large scale deployment of RFID technology such as in public transport ticketing systems and supply-chain management systems. In this model we define notions of security (only legitimate tags can authenticate) and of privacy (no adversary is capable of tracking legitimate tags). We show that privacy is always lost at the moment that a reader is compromised and we develop notions of forward and backward privacy with respect to reader corruption. This models the property that tags cannot be traced, under mild additional assumptions, for the time slots before and after reader corruption. We exhibit two protocols that only use hashing that achieve these security and privacy notions and give proofs in the random oracle model.