Limits on the provable consequences of one-way permutations
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
PLDI '92 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1992 conference on Programming language design and implementation
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
RSA-OAEP Is Secure under the RSA Assumption
Journal of Cryptology
Abstraction, Refinement And Proof For Probabilistic Systems (Monographs in Computer Science)
Abstraction, Refinement And Proof For Probabilistic Systems (Monographs in Computer Science)
Formal certification of a compiler back-end or: programming a compiler with a proof assistant
Conference record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Probabilistic guarded commands mechanized in HOL
Theoretical Computer Science - Quantitative aspects of programming languages (QAPL 2004)
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Proofs of randomized algorithms in Coq
Science of Computer Programming
Verified validation of lazy code motion
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
Why provable security matters?
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Formal proof of provable security by game-playing in a proof assistant
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
A probabilistic hoare-style logic for game-based cryptographic proofs
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
The security of triple encryption and a framework for code-based game-playing proofs
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Beyond provable security verifiable IND-CCA security of OAEP
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
Verifiable security of Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption
ProvSec'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Provable security
Verified indifferentiable hashing into elliptic curves
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
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CertiCrypt is a general framework to certify the security of cryptographic primitives in the Coq proof assistant. CertiCrypt adopts the code-based paradigm, in which the statement of security, and the hypotheses under which it is proved, are expressed using probabilistic programs. It provides a set of programming language tools (observational equivalence, relational Hoare logic, semantics-preserving program transformations) to assist in constructing proofs. Earlier publications of CertiCrypt provide an overview of its architecture and main components, and describe its application to signature and encryption schemes. This paper describes programming language techniques that arise specifically in cryptographic proofs. The techniques have been developed to complete a formal proof of IND-CCA security of the OAEP padding scheme. In this paper, we illustrate their usefulness for showing the PRP/PRF Switching Lemma, a fundamental cryptographic result that bounds the probability of an adversary to distinguish a family of pseudorandom functions from a family of pseudorandom permutations.