SIP proxies: new reflectors in the internet

  • Authors:
  • Ge Zhang;Jordi Jaen Pallares;Yacine Rebahi;Simone Fischer-Hübner

  • Affiliations:
  • Karlstad University, Karlstad, Sweden;Fraunhofer FOKUS, Berlin, Germany;Fraunhofer FOKUS, Berlin, Germany;Karlstad University, Karlstad, Sweden

  • Venue:
  • CMS'10 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

To mitigate identity theft in SIP networks, an inter-domain authentication mechanism based on certificates is proposed in RFC 4474 [10]. Unfortunately, the design of the certificate distribution in this mechanism yields some vulnerabilities. In this paper, we investigate an attack which exploits SIP infrastructures as reflectors to bring down a web server. Our experiments demonstrate that the attacks can be easily mounted. Finally, we discuss some potential methods to prevent this vulnerability.