Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Intrusion detection
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
Security for Wireless Ad--hoc Networks
Security for Wireless Ad--hoc Networks
A secure credit-based cooperation stimulating mechanism for MANETs using hash chains
Future Generation Computer Systems
A Secure Mechanism Design-Based and Game Theoretical Model for MANETs
Mobile Networks and Applications
Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach
Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach
Mixed-Strategy game based trust management for clustered wireless sensor networks
INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems
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One of the most challenging issues in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) is that the insiders are untrustworthy in packet forwarding stage. All the nodes which loss data-packets over a preset threshold can be generalized as Suspicious Insiders. To intimidate these suspicious insiders and reduce packet dropping, surveillance is the most direct and easiest method. In this paper, we propose a novel surveillance mechanism to monitor the packet dropping of suspicious insiders. On one hand, our work provides the monitor with optimal strategies which will maximize its long term utility; On the other hand, our work presents an on-demand monitoring scheme which will balance the tradeoff between security and resource consumption. First, we utilize a reputation scheme to distinguish suspicious insiders from legitimate members, and quantify the threat level of the suspicious insiders. Then taking into consideration security and resource consumption, we utilize game theory to analyze the interaction between monitor and suspicious insider. Finally, optimal mixed-strategy is computed to identify the best way for the monitor to respond to the suspicious insider.