Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Game Theoretic Stochastic Routing for Fault Tolerance and Security in Computer Networks
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Efficiency of selfish investments in network security
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
The “Price of Anarchy” Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs
Mathematics of Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Strategic games on defense trees
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion
Operations Research
Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach
Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach
Congestion games with player-specific constants
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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Network users can choose among different security solutions to protect their data. Those solutions are offered by competing providers, with possibly different performance and price levels. In this paper, we model the interactions among users as a noncooperative game, with a negative externality coming from the fact that attackers target popular systems to maximize their expected gain. Using a nonatomic weighted congestion game model for user interactions, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a user equilibrium, and exhibit the tractability of its computation, as a solution of a convex problem. We also compute the corresponding Price of Anarchy, that is the loss of efficiency due to user selfishness, and investigate some consequences for the (higher-level) pricing game played by security providers.