Securing publish/subscribe for multi-domain systems

  • Authors:
  • Jean Bacon;David Eyers;Ken Moody;Lauri Pesonen

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Cambridge, UK;University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Cambridge, UK;University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Cambridge, UK;University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Cambridge, UK

  • Venue:
  • Middleware'05 Proceedings of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX 6th international conference on Middleware
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Two convincing paradigms have emerged for achieving scalability in widely distributed systems: role-based, policy-driven control of access to the system by applications and for system management purposes; and publish/subscribe communication between loosely coupled components. Publish/subscribe provides efficient support for mutually anonymous, many-to-many communication between loosely coupled entities. In this paper we focus on securing such a communication service (1) by specifying and enforcing access control policy at the service API, and (2) by enforcing the security and privacy aspects of these policies within the service itself. We envisage independent but related administration domains that share a pub/sub communications infrastructure, typical of public-sector systems. Roles are named within each domain and role-related privileges for using the pub/sub service are specified. Intra- and inter-domain, controlled interaction is supported by negotiated policies. In a large-scale publish/subscribe service, domains are not expected to trust all message brokers fully. Attribute encryption allows a single publication to carry both confidential and public information safely, even via untrusted message brokers across a vulnerable communications substrate. Our approach provides the application designer with fine-grained expressiveness while, at the same time, improving system fault tolerance by allowing a single shared messaging network to route both public and confidential information. Early simulations show that our approach reduces the overall traffic compared with a secure scheme that encrypts whole messages.