Partial key recovery attacks on XCBC, TMAC and OMAC

Authors:
Chris J. Mitchell
Affiliations:
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
Venue:
IMA'05 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cryptography and Coding
Year:
2005

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Abstract

The security provided by the XCBC, TMAC and OMAC schemes is analysed and compared with other MAC schemes. In particular, ‘partial' key recovery attacks against all three of these schemes are described, yielding upper bounds on the effective security level. The results imply that there is relatively little to be gained practically through the introduction of these schemes by comparison with other well-established MAC functions.