Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Unlinkable serial transactions: protocols and applications
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SAC '99 Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols
Binding Bit Patterns to Real World Entities
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Authentic Attributes with Fine-Grained Anonymity Protection
FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secure sessions from weak secrets
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
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The contribution of this paper is an alternative mechanism for delegation, whereby users can share their credentials in such a way that it is difficult for the delegatee to re-use credentials of the delegator. An auditor in our protocol can link actions to individuals from the audit records but cannot forge audit records. We do not greatly restrict the choice of the delegation model semantics which can be adopted. Although the primary aim of our protocol is to provide support for anonymous delegation, it is still useful even if anonymity is not required at all, because of the ability to weaken trust assumptions.