An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Quantitative solution of omega-regular games380872
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Game-Based Verification of Non-repudiation and Fair Exchange Protocols
CONCUR '01 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Quantitative stochastic parity games
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A pairwise key predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Game-Based Analysis of Denial-of-Service Prevention Protocols
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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Many random key predistribution schemes have been proposed for pairwise key establishment in sensor networks recently. A general model of security under which these key predistribution techniques can be formally analyzed for correctness is required. In this paper, we have made such an attempt. We use the well known computational model of probabilistic turn based 2$\frac{1}{2}$-player games to model the key predistribution schemes and have shown how this model can be translated in formally specifying a property that these schemes should have. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work where we show the significance of probabilistic turn based 2$\frac{1}{2}$-player games in modelling security requirement of key predistribution schemes.