Incentives for content availability in memory-less peer-to-peer file sharing systems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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The asymptotic analysis of certain public good models for p2p file sharing systems focusing on content availability, suggests that when the aim is to maximize social welfare, a fixed contribution scheme in terms of the number of files shared per unity of time can be asymptotically optimal as the number of participants n grows to infinity (see [1] and references therein). Such an incentive scheme is very simple and attractive, and is also suitable for other p2p applications with similar public good charasteristics such as WLAN peering. However, its enforcement is not straightforward in cases where no trusted software or central entity accounting for peers' transactions can be assumed and peers are free to change their identity with no cost. That is, when no sort of user memory is available to be able to identify and punish the potential free riders.