The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Freenet: a distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
The free haven project: distributed anonymous storage service
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Probabilistic Simulations for Probabilistic Processes
CONCUR '94 Proceedings of the Concurrency Theory
Probabilistic Analysis of Anonymity
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Analysing the MUTE anonymous file-sharing system using the pi-calculus
FORTE'06 Proceedings of the 26th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems
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In this paper we study probable innocence, a notion of probabilistic anonymity provided by protocols such as Crowds. The authors of Crowds, Reiter and Rubin, gave a definition of probable innocence which later has been interpreted by other authors in terms of the probability of the users from the point of view of the observer. This formalization however does not seem to correspond exactly to the property that Reiter and Rubin have shown for Crowds, the latter, in fact, is independent from the probability of the users. We take the point of view that anonymity should be a concept depending only on the protocol, and should abstract from the probabilities of the users. For strong anonymity, this abstraction leads to a concept known as conditional anonymity. The main goal of this paper is to establish a notion which is to probable innocence as conditional anonymity is to strong anonymity. We show that our definition, while being more general, corresponds exactly to the property that Reiter and Rubin have shown for Crowds, under specific conditions. We also show that in the particular case that the users have uniform probabilities we obtain a property similar to the definition of probable innocence given by Halpern and O'Neill.