A decentralized model for information flow control
Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Trust and partial typing in open systems of mobile agents
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Authentication primitives and their compilation
Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information flow inference for free
ICFP '00 Proceedings of the fifth ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Functional programming
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Type-safe execution of mobile agents in anonymous networks
Secure Internet programming
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Secrecy by Typing inSecurity Protocols
TACS '97 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
A Type-Based Approach to Program Security
TAPSOFT '97 Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference CAAP/FASE on Theory and Practice of Software Development
CONCUR '00 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Using Replication and Partitioning to Build Secure Distributed Systems
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Type-based cryptographic operations
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A design for a security-typed language with certificate-based declassification
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
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This paper considers what happens when a system erroneously places trust in an attacker. More precisely we consider untyped attackers inside a distributed system in which security is enforced by the type system. Our Key-Based Decentralised Label Model for distributed access control combines a weak form of information flow control with cryptographic type casts. We extend our model to allow inside attackers by using three sets of type rules. The first set is for honest principals. The second set is for attackers; these rules require that only communication channels can be used to communicate and express our correctness conditions. The third set of type rules are used to type processes that have become corrupted by the attackers. We show that the untyped attackers can leak their own data and disrupt the communication of any principals that place direct trust in an attacker, but no matter what the attackers try, they cannot obtain data that does not include at least one attacker in its access control policy.