Technical Note: \cal Q-Learning
Machine Learning
The dynamics of reinforcement learning in cooperative multiagent systems
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate
Artificial Intelligence
Friend-or-Foe Q-learning in General-Sum Games
ICML '01 Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Machine Learning
Towards a pareto-optimal solution in general-sum games
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A polynomial-time Nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Utility based Q-learning to facilitate cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
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Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.