An experimental evaluation of the assumption of independence in multiversion programming
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Implementing fault-tolerant services using the state machine approach: a tutorial
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Building Diverse Computer Systems
HOTOS '97 Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS-VI)
Proving the Correctness of Multiprocess Programs
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
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The formal methods, fault-tolerance, and cyber-security research communities explore models that differ from each other. The differences frustrate efforts at cross-community collaboration. Moreover, ignorance about these differences means the status quo is likely to persist. This paper discusses two of the key differences: (i) the trace-based semantic foundation for formal methods and (ii) the implicit notions of independence.