Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish routing with atomic players
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
Approximation and Online Algorithms
The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks
Operations Research
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
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We study the quality of equilibrium in atomic splittable routing games. We show that in single-source single-sink games on series-parallel graphs, the price of collusion — the ratio of the total delay of atomic Nash equilibrium to the Wardrop equilibrium — is at most 1. This proves that the existing bounds on the price of anarchy for Wardrop equilibria carry over to atomic splittable routing games in this setting.