Cryptographic implementation of a tree hierarchy for access control
Information Processing Letters
Security analysis of a cryptographically-enabled RFID device
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Reverse-engineering a cryptographic RFID tag
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Security analysis of a widely deployed locking system
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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The Legic Prime system uses proprietary RFIDs to secure building access and micropayment applications. The employed algorithms rely on obscurity and consequently did not withstand scrutiny. This paper details how the algorithms were found from opening silicon chips as well as interacting with tags and readers. The security of the tags is based on several secret check-sums but no secret keys are employed that could lead to inherent security on the cards. Cards can be read, written to and spoofed using an emulator. Beyond these card weaknesses, we find that Legic's trust delegation model can be abused to create master tokens for all Legic installations.