Enforcing logically weaker knowledge in classical logic

  • Authors:
  • Philippe Besnard;Éric Grégoire;Sébastien Ramon

  • Affiliations:
  • IRIT CNRS UMR 5505, Toulouse, France;Université Lille - Nord de France, Lens, Artois;Université Lille - Nord de France, Lens, Artois

  • Venue:
  • KSEM'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Knowledge Science, Engineering and Management
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with a fundamental issue in knowledge representation and reasoning that, surprisingly, has received little attention so far. The point is that inserting some logically weaker (but, in a sense, more precise) information within a logic-based representation is not a straightforward process if the extra information must prevail. Indeed, it does neither prevail by itself nor disable the already existing logically stronger (but less precise) information that subsumes it. A general framework for solving this problem is introduced and instantiated to the task of making some rules prevail over more general ones.