Heterogeneous populations of learning agents in the minority game

  • Authors:
  • David Catteeuw;Bernard Manderick

  • Affiliations:
  • Computational Modeling Lab, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium;Computational Modeling Lab, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • ALA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Adaptive and Learning Agents
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We study how a group of adaptive agents can coordinate when competing for limited resources. A popular game theoretic model for this is the Minority Game. In this article we show that the coordination among learning agents can improve when agents use different learning parameters or even evolve their learning parameters. Better coordination leads to less resources being wasted and agents achieving higher individual performance. We also show that learning algorithms which achieve good results when all agents use that same algorithm, may be outcompeted when directly confronting other learning algorithms in the Minority Game.