Preimage attacks on Full-ARIRANG: analysis of DM-Mode with middle feed-forward

  • Authors:
  • Chiaki Ohtahara;Keita Okada;Yu Sasaki;Takeshi Shimoyama

  • Affiliations:
  • Chuo-University, Japan;Chuo-University, Japan;NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, NTT Corporation, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, Japan;Fujitsu Laboratories LTD, Japan

  • Venue:
  • WISA'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information Security Applications
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In this paper, we present preimage attacks on hash function ARIRANG, which is one of the first round candidates in the SHA-3 competition. Although ARIRANG was not chosen for the second round, the vulnerability as a hash function has not been discovered yet. ARIRANG has an unique design where the feed-forward operation is computed not only after the last step but also in a middle step. In fact, this design prevents previous preimage attacks from breaking full steps. In this paper, we apply a framework of meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks to ARIRANG. Specifically, we propose a new initial-structure technique optimized for ARIRANG that overcomes the use of the feed-forward to the middle. This enables us to find preimages of full steps ARIRANG-256 and ARIRANG-512 with 2254 and 2505 compression function operations and 26 and 216 amount of memory, respectively. These are the first results breaking the security of ARIRANG as a hash function.