Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Strong Key-Insulated Signature Schemes
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
OHTV(open hybrid TV) service platform based on terrestrial DTV
ICACT'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Advanced communication technology
Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Practical identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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Broadcasting and communications networks can be used together to offer hybrid broadcasting services that incorporate a variety of personalized information from communications networks in TV programs. To enable these services, many different applications have to be run on a user terminal, and it is necessary to establish an environment where any service provider can create applications and distribute them to users. The danger is that malicious service providers might distribute applications which may cause user terminals to take undesirable actions. To prevent such applications from being distributed, we propose an application authentication protocol for hybrid broadcasting and communications services. Concretely, we modify a key-insulated signature scheme and apply it to this protocol. In the protocol, a broadcaster distributes a signing key to a service provider that the broadcaster trusts. As a result, users can verify that an application is reliable. If a signed application causes an undesirable action, a broadcaster can revoke the privileges and permissions of the service provider. In addition, it can update the signing key. That is, our protocol is secure against leakage of the signing key by the broadcaster. Moreover, a user terminal uses only one verification key for verifying a signature, so the memory needed for storing the verification key in the user terminal's is very small. With our protocol, users can securely receive hybrid services from broadcasting and communications networks.