Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Encryption against Storage-Bounded Adversaries from On-Line Strong Extractors
Journal of Cryptology
Optimal Randomizer Efficiency in the Bounded-Storage Model
Journal of Cryptology
An Introduction to Quantum Computing
An Introduction to Quantum Computing
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoring
SFCS '94 Proceedings of the 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Universally composable quantum multi-party computation
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Generalized privacy amplification
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory - Part 2
Sampling of Min-Entropy Relative to Quantum Knowledge
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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It is well known that classical computationally-secure cryptosystems may be susceptible to quantum attacks, i.e., attacks by adversaries able to process quantum information. A prominent example is the RSA public key cryptosystem, whose security is based on the hardness of factoring; it can be broken using a quantum computer running Shor's efficient factoring algorithm. In this extended abstract, we review an argument which shows that a similar problem can arise even if a cryptosystem provides information-theoretic security. As long as its security analysis is carried out within classical information theory, attacks by quantum adversaries cannot in general be excluded.