Foisting and stealing of keys in sensor networks

  • Authors:
  • Peng Wang;Chinya Ravishankar

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California, Riverside;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California, Riverside

  • Venue:
  • EWSN'12 Proceedings of the 9th European conference on Wireless Sensor Networks
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

We consider cryptographic key establishment in sensor networks without PKI or trusted third parties, using pairwise trust relationships between intermediaries. We describe a novel attack called key foisting that defeats current schemes, compromising 90% of the path keys with only 10% of the sensors in the network seized. We then present a two-way path-key establishment scheme that resists foisting. It reduces the probability of successful key foisting to nearly zero even with 20% of sensors seized. Its overhead is affordable, and its resilience is excellent.