An axiomatic basis for computer programming
Communications of the ACM
Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems in the Presence of Permanent and Transient Faults
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Simplify: a theorem prover for program checking
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Constructive and Destructive Use of Compilers in Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Journal of Cryptology
So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users
NSPW '09 Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on New security paradigms workshop
The Why/Krakatoa/Caduceus platform for deductive program verification
CAV'07 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Computer aided verification
Cryptography in theory and practice: the case of encryption in IPsec
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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We analyse and exploit implementation features in OpenSSL version 0.9.8g which permit an attack against ECDH-based functionality. The attack, although more general, can recover the entire (static) private key from an associated SSL server via 633 adaptive queries when the NIST curve P-256 is used. One can view it as a software-oriented analogue of the bug attack concept due to Biham et al. and, consequently, as the first bug attack to be successfully applied against a real-world system. In addition to the attack and a posteriori countermeasures, we show that formal verification, while rarely used at present, is a viable means of detecting the features which the attack hinges on. Based on the security implications of the attack and the extra justification posed by the possibility of intentionally incorrect implementations in collaborative software development, we conclude that applying and extending the coverage of formal verification to augment existing test strategies for OpenSSL-like software should be deemed a worthwhile, long-term challenge.