G2C: cryptographic protocols from goal-driven specifications

  • Authors:
  • Michael Backes;Matteo Maffei;Kim Pecina;Raphael M. Reischuk

  • Affiliations:
  • Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany;Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany;Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany;Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

  • Venue:
  • TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We present G2C, a goal-driven specification language for distributed applications. This language offers support for the declarative specification of functionality goals and security properties. The former comprise the parties, their inputs, and the goal of the communication protocol. The latter comprise secrecy, access control, and anonymity requirements. A key feature of our language is that it abstracts away from how the intended functionality is achieved, but instead lets the system designer concentrate on which functional features and security properties should be achieved. Our framework provides a compilation method for transforming G2C specifications into symbolic cryptographic protocols, which are shown to be optimal. We provide a technique to automatically verify the correctness and security of these protocols using ProVerif, a state-of-the-art automated theorem-prover for cryptographic protocols. We have implemented a G2C compiler to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach.