Formal analysis of CWA 14890-1

Authors:
Ashar Javed
Affiliations:
Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH), Hamburg, Germany
Venue:
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Formal analysis is of importance in order to increase confidence that the protocol satisfies its security requirements. In particular, the results obtained from the formal analysis of the smart card security protocols when smart cards are used as a specific type of Secure Signature Creation Devices (SSCDs) are presented. SSCDs are developed to support the EU-directive on electronic signatures. In this paper, we focus on security properties, called the authentication and secrecy . The device authentication protocols mentioned in CWA 14890-1 are modeled using the high-level protocol specification language HLPSL and verified with the help of AVISPA tool. Our formal analysis does not reveal any weaknesses of the CWA 14890-1 protocol suite.