Incentive compatible regression learning
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategyproof classification under constant hypotheses: a tale of two functions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the limits of dictatorial classification
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computing socially-efficient cake divisions
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Positive results for mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper we study the problem of allocating divisible items to agents without payments. We assume no prior knowledge about the agents. The utility of an agent is additive. The social welfare of a mechanism is defined as the overall utility of all agents. This model is first defined by Guo and Conitzer [7]. Here we are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms that have a good competitive ratio, that is, those that are able to achieve social welfare close to the maximal social welfare in all cases. First, for the setting of n agents and m items, we prove that there is no (1/m+ε)-competitive strategy-proof mechanism, for any ε0. And, no mechanism can achieve a competitive ratio better than $4/\sqrt{n}$, when $m \ge \sqrt{n}$. Next we study the setting of two agents and m items, which is also the focus of [7]. We prove that the competitive ratio of any swap-dictatorial mechanism is no greater than $1/2 + 1/\sqrt{\left\lbrack\log{m}\right\rbrack }$. Then we give a characterization result: for the case of 2 items, if the mechanism is strategy-proof, symmetric and second order continuously differentiable, then it is always swap-dictatorial. In the end we consider a setting where an agent's valuation of each item is bounded by C/m, where C is an arbitrary constant. We show a mechanism that is (1/2+ε(C))-competitive, where ε(C)0.