Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Selfish Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games
Algorithmica
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the windfall of friendship: inoculation strategies on social networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A new model for selfish routing
Theoretical Computer Science
Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Congestion games, load balancing, and price of anarchy
CAAN'04 Proceedings of the First international conference on Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking
Social context in potential games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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Most work in algorithmic game theory assumes that players ignore costs incurred by their fellow players. In this paper, we consider superimposing a social network over a game, where players are concerned with minimizing not only their own costs, but also the costs of their neighbors in the network. We aim to understand how properties of the underlying game are affected by this alteration to the standard model. The new social game has its own equilibria, and the price of civil society denotes the ratio of the social cost of the worst such equilibrium relative to the worst Nash equilibrium under standard selfish play. We initiate the study of the price of civil society in the context of a simple class of games. Counterintuitively, we show that when players become less selfish (optimizing over both themselves and their friends), the resulting outcomes may be worse than they would have been in the base game. We give tight bounds on this phenomenon in a simple class of load-balancing games, over arbitrary social networks, and present some extensions.