FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Algorithmic Game Theory
Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A new model for selfish routing
Theoretical Computer Science
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Better vaccination strategies for better people
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The impact of altruism on the efficiency of atomic congestion games
TGC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trustworthly global computing
Pure nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Selfishness level of strategic games
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Approaching utopia: strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms
Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
Social context in potential games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Altruism in Atomic Congestion Games
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We study the inefficiency of equilibria for several classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i 's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1−α i times his direct cost and α i times the social cost. Tuning the parameters α i allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study altruistic extensions of cost-sharing games, utility games, and linear congestion games. Our main contribution is an adaptation of Roughgarden's smoothness notion to altruistic extensions of games. We show that this extension captures the essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games, and use it to derive mostly tight bounds.