PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Algebraic and Slide Attacks on KeeLoq
Fast Software Encryption
A Statistical Saturation Attack against the Block Cipher PRESENT
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
KATAN and KTANTAN -- A Family of Small and Efficient Hardware-Oriented Block Ciphers
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Algebraic Cryptanalysis
Algebraic cryptanalysis of the data encryption standard
Cryptography and Coding'07 Proceedings of the 11th IMA international conference on Cryptography and coding
PRINTcipher: a block cipher for IC-printing
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Algebraic side-channel attacks
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Differential cryptanalysis of round-reduced PRINTCIPHER: computing roots of permutations
FSE'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Fast software encryption
Algebraic precomputations in differential and integral cryptanalysis
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
A cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher: the invariant subspace attack
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Many weak keys for PRINTCIPHER: fast key recovery and countermeasures
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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In this paper we analyze the recently proposed lightweight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions with only 2 known plaintexts faster than brute force. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights of some three-bit states. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity.