Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48

  • Authors:
  • Stanislav Bulygin;Johannes Buchmann

  • Affiliations:
  • Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt - CASED, Darmstadt, Germany;Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt - CASED, Darmstadt, Germany

  • Venue:
  • CANS'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the recently proposed lightweight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions with only 2 known plaintexts faster than brute force. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights of some three-bit states. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity.