Linear cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher: trails and samples everywhere

  • Authors:
  • Martin Ågren;Thomas Johansson

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. of Electrical and Information Technology, Lund University, Lund, Sweden;Dept. of Electrical and Information Technology, Lund University, Lund, Sweden

  • Venue:
  • INDOCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptology in India
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

PRINTcipher is a recent lightweight block cipher designed by Knudsen et al. Some noteworthy characteristics are a burnt-in key, a key-dependent permutation layer and identical round keys. Independent work on PRINTcipher has identified weak key classes that allow for a key recovery -- the obvious countermeasure is to avoid these weak keys at the cost of a small loss of key entropy. This paper identifies several larger classes of weak keys. We show how to distinguish classes of keys and give a 28-round linear attack applicable to half the keys. We show that there are several similar attacks, each focusing on a specific class of keys. We also observe how some specific properties of PRINTcipher allow us to collect several samples from each plaintext---ciphertext pair. We use this property to construct an attack on 29-round PRINTcipher applicable to a fraction 2−5 of the keys.