The Cricket location-support system
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Introduction to Cryptography: With Coding Theory
Introduction to Cryptography: With Coding Theory
Wireless sensor networks for habitat monitoring
WSNA '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Wireless sensor networks and applications
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Understanding packet delivery performance in dense wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Taming the underlying challenges of reliable multihop routing in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Intrusion Tolerance and Anti-Traffic Analysis Strategies For Wireless Sensor Networks
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
A wireless sensor network For structural monitoring
SenSys '04 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
TAG: a Tiny AGgregation service for Ad-Hoc sensor networks
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
The feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Enhancing Source-Location Privacy in Sensor Network Routing
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Integrated coverage and connectivity configuration for energy conservation in sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
Achieving Real-Time Target Tracking UsingWireless Sensor Networks
RTAS '06 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium
Countermeasures Against Traffic Analysis Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Protecting Location Privacy Through Path Confusion
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Anonymous Usage of Location-Based Services Through Spatial and Temporal Cloaking
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
Temporal Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks
ICDCS '07 Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Castalia: revealing pitfalls in designing distributed algorithms in WSN
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Towards event source unobservability with minimum network traffic in sensor networks
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Source location privacy against laptop-class attacks in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
Zeroing-in on network metric minima for sink location determination
Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Wireless network security
Using data aggregation to prevent traffic analysis in wireless sensor networks
DCOSS'06 Proceedings of the Second IEEE international conference on Distributed Computing in Sensor Systems
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The viability and success of wireless sensor networks critically hinge on the ability of a small number of sinks to glean sensor data throughout the networks. Thus, the locations of sinks are critically important. In this paper, we examine the sink location privacy problem from both the attack and defense perspectives. First, we examine resource-constrained adversaries who can only eavesdrop the network at their vicinities. To determine the sink location, they can launch a Zeroing-In attack by leveraging the fact that several network metrics are 2-dimensional functions in the plane of the network, and their values minimize at the sink. Thus, determining the sink location is equivalent to finding the minima of those functions. We demonstrate that by obtaining the hop counts or the arrival time of a broadcast packet at a few spots in the network, the adversaries are able to determine the sink location with the accuracy of one radio range, which is sufficient to disable the sink by launching jamming attacks, for example. To cope with the Zeroing-In attacks, we present a directed-walk-based routing scheme and show that the defense strategy is effective in deceiving adversaries at little energy costs.