Distributed iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies

Authors:
Andreas Witzel;Krzysztof R. Apt;Jonathan A. Zvesper
Affiliations:
CIMS, New York University, New York, USA 10003;CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 1098 XG;Oxford University Computing Laboratory, Oxford, UK OX1 3QD
Venue:
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Year:
2012

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Abstract

We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among rational agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form games equipped with an interaction structure, which specifies which groups of players can communicate their preferences with each other. We then focus on a specific form of interaction, namely a distributed form of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS), driven by communication among the agents. We study the outcome of IESDS after some (possibly all) messages about players' preferences have been sent. The main result of the paper, Theorem 4, provides an epistemic justification of this form of IESDS.