Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks
LISA '99 Proceedings of the 13th USENIX conference on System administration
ReVirt: enabling intrusion analysis through virtual-machine logging and replay
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
Network intrusion detection: evasion, traffic normalization, and end-to-end protocol semantics
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Dynamic application-layer protocol analysis for network intrusion detection
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on Behavior Profiles
ACSAC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Pushing boulders uphill: the difficulty of network intrusion recovery
LISA'09 Proceedings of the 23rd conference on Large installation system administration
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Most existing intrusion detection systems take a passive approach to observing attacks or noticing exploits. We suggest that active intrusion detection (AID) techniques provide value, particularly in scenarios where an administrator attempts to recover a network infrastructure from a compromise. In such cases, an attacker may have corrupted fundamental services (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS, NTP), and existing IDS or auditing tools may lack the precision or pervasive deployment to observe symptoms of this corruption. We prototype a specific instance of the active intrusion detection approach: how we can use an AID mechanism based on packet injection to help detect rogue services.