Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
PPay: micropayments for peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A case for taxation in peer-to-peer streaming broadcast
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Collaboration-aware peer-to-peer media streaming
Proceedings of the 12th annual ACM international conference on Multimedia
WhoPay: A Scalable and Anonymous Payment System for Peer-to-Peer Environments
ICDCS '06 Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Using layered video to provide incentives in P2P live streaming
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Peer-to-peer streaming and IP-TV
Towards an Incentive Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Multimedia Live Streaming Systems
P2P '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Eighth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
The bittorrent p2p file-sharing system: measurements and analysis
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
SPECT: A system for Peer-to-Peer economic transactions
ISCC '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications
Service differentiated peer selection: an incentive mechanism for peer-to-peer media streaming
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Incentive mechanism plays an essential role in guaranteeing the performance of P2P streaming systems. This paper proposed a Credit-line based Layered Taxation (CLT) incentive mechanism, which is fully distributed and does not rely on any central server for credit management. The CLT mechanism also avoids the problem of reputation accumulation in reputation-based systems and trade limitation in the reciprocity-based systems. In addition, the formed layered topology and taxation strategy can inspire peers to contribute their bandwidth, and maximize both individual utility and system utility. Our simulation results indicate that, with our proposed incentive mechanism, cooperative peers can gain much better performance, while free riders would be cleared out of the system.