A survey of bargaining models for grid resource allocation
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Relaxed-criteria G-negotiation for Grid resource co-allocation
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Decision making of negotiation agents using markov chains
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Negotiation and Scheduling Mechanisms for Multiagent Systems
Retractable contract network for empowerment in workforce scheduling
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Negotiation and Scheduling Mechanisms for Multiagent Systems
Market based resource allocation with incomplete information
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics - Special issue on human computing
Evolving best-response strategies for market-driven agents using aggregative fitness GA
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Concurrent negotiation and coordination for grid resource coallocation
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics - Special issue on game theory
Grid resource negotiation: survey and new directions
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Strategic agents for multi-resource negotiation
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Towards complex negotiation for cloud economy
GPC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing
Negotiation strategies considering opportunity functions for grid scheduling
Euro-Par'07 Proceedings of the 13th international Euro-Par conference on Parallel Processing
Market_based grid resource allocation using new negotiation model
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
The Journal of Supercomputing
A new fuzzy negotiation protocol for grid resource allocation
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
The Journal of Supercomputing
Expectation of trading agent behaviour in negotiation of electronic marketplace
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
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While evaluation of many e-negotiation agents are carried out through empirical studies, this work supplements and complements existing literature by analyzing the problem of designing market-driven agents (MDAs) in terms of equilibrium points and stable strategies. MDAs are negotiation agents designed to make prudent compromises taking into account factors such as time preference, outside option, and rivalry. This work shows that 1) in a given market situation, an MDA negotiates optimally because it makes minimally sufficient concession, and 2) by modeling negotiation of MDAs as a game Γ of incomplete information, it is shown that the strategies adopted by MDAs are stable. In a bilateral negotiation, it is proven that the strategy pair of two MDAs forms a sequential equilibrium for Γ. In a multilateral negotiation, it is shown that the strategy profile of MDAs forms a market equilibrium for Γ.