Protecting browser state from web privacy attacks
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on World Wide Web
InfoScale '06 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Scalable information systems
Generating a privacy footprint on the internet
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Tracking website data-collection and privacy practices with the iWatch web crawler
Proceedings of the 3rd symposium on Usable privacy and security
Privacy diffusion on the web: a longitudinal perspective
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
On the leakage of personally identifiable information via online social networks
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Online social networks
An empirical study of privacy-violating information flows in JavaScript web applications
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
How unique is your web browser?
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
An analysis of private browsing modes in modern browsers
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising
Management Science
Privad: practical privacy in online advertising
Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implementation
Towards understanding modern web traffic
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
Privacy-preserving social plugins
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Functional privacy or why cookies are better with milk
HotSec'12 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Hot Topics in Security
Proceedings of the 10th Performance Metrics for Intelligent Systems Workshop
Understanding what they do with what they know
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Expressive privacy control with pseudonyms
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on SIGCOMM
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web companion
Your browsing behavior for a big mac: economics of personal information online
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Measuring personalization of web search
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
Do not embarrass: re-examining user concerns for online tracking and advertising
Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
AdReveal: improving transparency into online targeted advertising
Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
Adscape: harvesting and analyzing online display ads
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
Quite a mess in my cookie jar!: leveraging machine learning to protect web authentication
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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While third-party tracking on the web has garnered much attention, its workings remain poorly understood. Our goal is to dissect how mainstream web tracking occurs in the wild. We develop a client-side method for detecting and classifying five kinds of third-party trackers based on how they manipulate browser state. We run our detection system while browsing the web and observe a rich ecosystem, with over 500 unique trackers in our measurements alone. We find that most commercial pages are tracked by multiple parties, trackers vary widely in their coverage with a small number being widely deployed, and many trackers exhibit a combination of tracking behaviors. Based on web search traces taken from AOL data, we estimate that several trackers can each capture more than 20% of a user's browsing behavior. We further assess the impact of defenses on tracking and find that no existing browser mechanisms prevent tracking by social media sites via widgets while still allowing those widgets to achieve their utility goals, which leads us to develop a new defense. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the most complete study of web tracking to date.