Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control Theory: A Concise Introduction
Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control Theory: A Concise Introduction
Buying private data at auction: the sensitive surveyor's problem
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Is privacy compatible with truthfulness?
Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
Privacy auctions for recommender systems
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Take it or leave it: running a survey when privacy comes at a cost
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
A theory of pricing private data
Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Database Theory
Privacy and coordination: computing on databases with endogenous participation
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Redrawing the boundaries on purchasing data from privacy-sensitive individuals
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
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We consider the problem of conducting a survey with the goal of obtaining an unbiased estimator of some population statistic when individuals have unknown costs (drawn from a known prior) for participating in the survey. Individuals must be compensated for their participation and are strategic agents, and so the payment scheme must incentivize truthful behavior. We derive optimal truthful mechanisms for this problem for the two goals of minimizing the variance of the estimator given a fixed budget, and minimizing the expected cost of the survey given a fixed variance goal.